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Case No. 7675·' 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
EVA EISNER, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE CITY, a Municipi.l 
C.orpora,tion, 
Defendant, Third-Party 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
LEO BONNERU, 
Third Party Defendant 
and Respondent. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HoNORABLE DAVID T. LEwis, Judge 
·. ~-~.~ ~:,. . .. WLINGS, WALLACE, BLACK, 1f r~~ -~ . :: ERTS & BLACK, 
·i ~ ;d~ ~- IGHT L. KING, 
, !· 1 1 n '1 ,: 9 ~:·~ ·\ Attorneys for Plaintiff j u 1- ,'....; ~ ~ .._.; 
.. ... -ffl~ _.and .Appellant, 
' ·c;:~~;;:s"~;;;;;;;c;:;~;~:-etab 530 Judge Building, 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
EVA EISNER, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE CITY, a Municipal 
Corporation, 
Defendant, Third-Party 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
LEO BONNERU, 
Third Party Defendant 
and Respondent. 




The parties herein will be referred to as follows : 
plaintiff and appellant will be referred to as plaintiff, 
and both defendant and third party plaintiff and third 
party defendant will be referred to as defendants. 
This appeal arises out of a judgment of dis1nissal 
with prejudice at the close of plaintiff's case. 
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STArEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff, a woman 55 years of age, was walking in a 
westerly direction on the south side of Third South 
Street on the 26th day of November, 1949, at approx-
imately 10:30 A.M. It was a Saturday and the morning 
on which the Santa Claus parade was being conducted 
in downtown Salt Lake (R. 24, 25). Plaintiff was approx-
imately in front of the Fitwell Artificial Limb Company's 
place of business at 125 West 3rd South, when a large 
group of children going east met her. She stepped a 
little to the north to avoid them and into a deep hole 
in the sidewalk, which caused her to fall forward onto 
a water meter lid, a few feet 'vest of the hole. As a 
result of her fall, plaintiff suffered a skinned face, 
bruises and abrasions on her right side and a broken 
right wrist (R. 26). 
Plaintiff had lived and resided for many years a 
short distance "\vest of the place where she fell and was 
familiar with the sidewalk (R. 28). There were approx-
imately 50 or 60 children, some running and some walk-
ing, in the crowd that met plaintiff (R. 29). Plaintiff 
did not look to the north as she stepped aside, but was 
watching the children ( R. 46). She did not see the 
hole at the time she stepped into it (R. 47). The chil-
dren did not run into plaintiff or touch her, but plaintiff 
was carefully watching the children as they passed to 
prevent them running into her (R. 48). 
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It was stipulated at the trial that defendant Salt 
Lake City and defendant Leo Bonneru had both ex-
cavated near the point where plaintiff fell. Salt Lake 
City on October 21, 1948 excavated a hole for the pur-
pose of installing the 'vater meter manhole. On Septem-
ber 28, 1948 the permit was issued by Salt Lake City to 
the defendant Leo Bonneru to excavate for sewer line 
and install a sewer at the Fitwell place of business (R. 
18, 19). The excavation for the sewer line was com-
pleted on October 9, 1948 (R. 75). The depressed area 
covered the entire north side of a cement slab. Plaintiff 
testified that the area where she fell had been in the 
same condition about a year prior to her fall. Its con-
dition had been the same ever since the Artificial Limb 
building was finished and the sewer pipes installed (R. 
41). 
The defect into which plaintiff fell consists of a 
hole and depressed area along the edge of the side of 
the cement slab on which plaintiff was walking. At the 
point where plaintiff fell, the sidewalk for one cement 
slah narrows from its usual width of two cement slabs 
to a single cement slab. This condition is revealed and 
illustrated by plaintiff's Exhibits "E" and "F". 
The hole was 8 inches deep, was immediately adja-
cent to the north side of the cement slab, sloped from 
the water meter lid to the east and was deepest on the 
east side where plaintiff n1arked the place she stepped 
into it (R. 71). 
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4 
At the close of plaintiff's evidence defendant Salt 
Lake City moved the court for a directed verdict of no 
cause of action, on the ground that the evidence showed 
conclusively that plaintiff herself was guilty of con-
tributory negligence (R. 78). The motion was granted, 
the court stating that in his opinion the evidence con-
clusively showed that the accident was caused at least 
in part by the negligence of plaintiff herself, and there-
upon plaintiff's cause of action was dismissed with 
prejudice (R. 79, 80). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUME·NT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN RULING AS MATTER OF LAW 
THAT PLAINTIFF WAS CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN RULING AS MATTER OF LA'V 
THAT PLAINTIFF WAS CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT. 
The basic proposition which is presented for the 
court's consideration in this appeal is whether or not 
the plaintiff, being familiar with the defect in the city 
sidewalk, was as matter of law contributorily negligent 
in attempting to "' ... alk past the defect at a time when 
a large number of small children were meeting and 
passing her. There is no dispute concerning the negli-
gence of both defendants. Apparently it is conceded 
that to allow the hole into which plaintiff stepped to 
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5 
remain along the north edge of the cement slab for over 
a year, would be negligence on the part of both defend-
ants. 
Plaintiff has examined a great number of cases and 
all seem to be uniform in their holding that the mere 
fact that a person knows or is aware of a defect in a 
public sidewalk into which he falls, does not show con-
tributory negligence as matter of law. 
A case illustrating these holdings is Smith v. City 
of Tacoma, 163 Wash. 626, 1 P. 2d 870, 871. Plaintiff 
was familiar with the defect in the sidewalk and had 
traveled over it for a long period of time. She had 
just crossed it a fe,v minutes before on her way to shop 
and it 'vas daylight. The defendant contended that they 
should have j1;1dgment notwithstanding the verdict be-
cause of contributory negligence. The Supreme Court 
of Washington refused to grant such a motion and states 
the rule of law applicable in the following language: 
"'The mere fact that the appellant was aware 
of the defective condition of the sidewalk when 
the accident occurred is not per se conclusive of 
negligence on his part, though it was competent 
evidence on the question of contributory negli-
gence. * * * All that the law required was the 
exercise of such care and caution as a person of 
ordinary prudence would use under similar cir-
cunlstances.' " 
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Plaintiff submits that the quoted language is an 
obvious, sound and applicable principle and should be 
applied to the present case. 
Many of the cases in which the principle that knowl-
edge alone is not sufficient to make a person contribu-
torily negligent as matter of law, base their ruling on 
the fact that an injured person may have forgotten 
about the defect or may have had their attentions tem-
porarily diverted from the defect. All agree that the 
only standard to which plaintiff must conform is that 
of a reasonable and prudent person under like or similar 
circumstances. 
There are hundreds of types of diversions and dis-
tractions which have been ruled by the courts as suffi. 
cient to justify a jury in finding that the injured person 
was not contributorily negligent as matter of law. A few 
of those cases which are near to the facts of the present 
case are cited and discussed herein as illustrations of 
the principle. 
Denton v. City of Twin Falls, 54 Idaho 35, 28 P. 2d 
· 202, 203, involved a fall on a raised portion of the side-
walk in Twin Falls. Plaintiff therein stated as follows 
in answer to a question regarding his state of mind con-
cerning the defect of which he had knowledge. 
" 'Q. Yes, You had the two young ladies with 
you, and you knew that this place was very dan-
gerous; but you were not paying very much at-
tention to the girls; and yet you think you must 
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have forgotten about that place' Is that correct? 
A. \\!.,.ell, I had crossed over the place a number 
of times and had got kind of used to going over it; 
yet I knew that anyone had to take especial care 
in going over that place without stumbling and 
falling.' 
" 'Q. And what happened when you got up 
in the immediate vicinity of this 812 Fourth Ave-
nue West, ~Ir. Denton' A. Well, I was just walk-
ing along there and I came up by No. 812, and 
there was some boys out there in the yard play-
ing and holloring, and just as I went to pass 
over this break one of them yelled out, and it 
kind of startled me and I looked around to see 
what was going on, and the thing that I next 
knew I was getting up.' 
"'Q. Well, what I am trying to get at, Mr. 
Denton, what was the reason that you lost your 
footing and fell' A. Well, I stumped my foot over 
this broken place there in the walk and fell.' 
" 'Q. Now, you stated to your counsel, in 
answer to a question that there was some outcry 
or some yell from some of the children playing 
in a yard nearby. Do you remember that' A. Yes, 
sir.' " 
Defendant's motion for judgment of nonsuit and the 
contention that plaintiff was guilty of contributory 
negligence as matter of law was overruled. 
The Supreme Court of Idaho on appeal reviewed 
at great length the doctrine of temporary forgetfulness 
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in relation to contributory negligence and stated at page 
204 the rule which they applied in affirming the judg-
ment for plaintiff: 
"Touching the question of temporary forget-
fulness, in another 'sidewalk' case, Butland v. 
City of Caldwell, 51 Idaho, 483, 488, 6 P. (2d) 493, 
496, this court expressed itself as follows: 'Tempo-
rary forgetfulness, inattention, or distraction 
do not generally constitute contributory negli-
gence. 'When a person has exercised the care 
and caution which an ordinarily prudent person 
would have exercised under the same or similar 
circumstances, he is not negligent merely because 
he temporarily forgot or was inattentive to a 
known danger.' 45 C. J. 950, and authorities cited. 
Ordinary care is all that is required. 45 .c. J. 947, 
949, and authorities cited. Osier v. Consumers' 
Co., 42 Idaho, 789, 796, 248 P. 438; Giffen v. City 
of Lewiston, 6 Idaho, 231, 55 P. 545.' " 
In Cox v. City of Coffeyville, 153 Kan. 392, 110 P. 
2d 772, the Supreme C-ourt reversed a ruling by a lower 
court which had sustained a demurrer to plaintiff's com-
plaint. Plaintiff was walking on the sidewalk and when 
he came alongside of the hole in the sidewalk into which 
he fell, he met one Moore carrying an armload of grocer-
ies. Moore passed plaintiff so close that plaintiff fell 
into the hole. There was no evidence that Moore bumped 
plaintiff into the hole, but only that he passed close to 
plaintiff and plaintiff stepped aside to avoid a collision 
and fell into the hole. At the time plaintiff was living 
within 40 feet of the hole, knew of its existence from the 
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many times that he had walked along the sidewalk, and 
immediately prior to n1eeting him, was walking to the side 
of the hole. The Kansas Court stated the general princi-
ple that the mere knowledge on the part of plaintiff did 
not conclusively show contributory negligence, and then 
cited an earlier Kansas case entitled City of Olathe v. 
Mi.zee, 48 Kan. 435, 29 P. 754, 30 Am. St. Rep. 308, which 
set forth the principle and general rule that a person 
whose faculties of observation or memory are tempo-
rarily distracted as regards a dangerous condition is 
virtually in the same mental position as one who has 
never acquired knowledge of such dangerous condition. 
Plaintiff submits that the Cox case sets forth sound, 
api)licable prineiples of la\v and should be adopted 
by this court and made the law of Utah. 
In support of the general principle, the Kansas 
Court cites 13 A.L.R. 87, wherein excuses for failure to 
observe and avoid defect or obstruction is annotated. 
Three basic cases set forth the principle and are cited 
in the annotation. They are: Thomas v. New Y ark, 28 
Hun(N.Y.) 110; Barr v. Fairfax, 156 Mo. App. 295, 137 
S.W. 631; Kenyon v. Mondovi, 98 Wis. 50, 73 N.W. 314. 
In Thomas v. New Y ark, it was ruled that a person 
whose attention was diverted from a dangerous condi-
tion by a crowd was not guilty of contributory negligence 
as matter of law. 
In Barr v. Fairfax the approach of another person 
diverted plaintiff's attention from the defect. 
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In Kenyon v. Mondovi the pedestrian's attention was 
diverted by being accosted by a friend. 
An interesting case in point in one of our neighbor-
ing jurisdictions is Mullins v. City of Butte, 93 Mont. 601, 
20 P. 2d 626, 627. Plaintiff was a pregnant woman who 
fell near her home on a public sidewalk with which she 
was very familiar and about which she had been warned 
immediately prior to her fall. The diversion which dis-
tracted her attention from the dangerous condition was 
the crying of her five year old son. The defect in the 
sidewalk upon which plaintiff fell was a cracked and 
broken condition, which had been present for more than 
a year and over which the plaintiff had passed at various 
times during a six month period immediately preceding 
her fall. The Supreme Court of Montana in quoting the 
rules for which plaintiff contends states: 
"It is also urged that the plaintiff was guilty 
of contributory negligence because she had knowl-
edge that the sidewalk was defective; also as a 
result of the warning by her husband. Mere 
knowledge of an offending .instrumentality does 
not constitute contributory negligence. Neilson v. 
Missoula Creamery Co., 59 Mont. 270, 196 P. 357. 
The attention of a pedestrian may be diverted 
by various causes, but a mere temporary diversion 
does not 1nake him guilty of contributory negli-
gence as a matter of law. 7 McQuillin on Munici-
pal Corporations, 261; Smith v. Clayton Con-
struction Co., 189 Wis. 91, 206 N. W. 67. 
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•'A number of photographs of the sidewalk 
were received in evidence, but these are not a part 
of the record in this court. 
HlTnder the facts and circumstances presented 
by the record, we are entirely unwilling to say 
that the plaintiff is shown to have been negligent 
as a matter of law. The court properly submitted 
the question of contributory negligence to the 
jury." 
Three California cases which involve somewhat simi-:-
lar facts and which applied the principle for which plain-
tiff here contends are Barry v. Terkildsen, 72 Cal. 254, 
13 P. 657; Van Praag v. Gale, 107 Cal. 438, 40 P. 555; 
Du l" al v. Boos Bros .. Cafeteria Co., 45 Cal. App. 377, 
187 P. 767. 
In Barry v. Terkildsen plaintiff's attention was at-
tracted to some children playing in the street at the 
moment she stepped into the open hole. The court held 
that she was not guilty of contributory negligence as 
matter of law. 
In Van Praag v. Gale plaintiff was reading a news-
paper and walked into an open doorway. The question 
of contributory negligence was again ruled as one of fact 
for the jury to decide. 
In Du Val v. Boos Bros. Cafeteria Co. plaintiff fell 
into an open elevator shaft at a time when her attention 
was attracted to something she was passing on the high-
way. Again the question of contributory negligence was 
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properly submitted to the jury. At page 769 the court 
sets forth the following interesting statement of fact and 
principles applicable: 
"In the present case the respondent testified 
that when 10 or 12 feet from the elevator doors she 
saw they were closed. Her attention being at-
tracted to something she was passing, she turned 
her head, and as she walked that short distance, 
one of the doors was raised from the pitfall di-
rectly in her pathway and into which she fell. 
As was said in the opinion in Van Praag v. Gale : 
" 'To some minds probably the conclusion 
would seem irresistible that he· who, with eyes to 
see, in broad daylight walks into an open trapdoor 
in the sidewalk is lacking in that care and caution 
which characterizes the man of ordinary prudence. 
Others may well reason that plaintiff was entitled 
to a safe passage over a walk prepared by the 
public for the accommodation of all its citizens.' 
"The fact that different minds might reach 
(different conclusions upon the question of the 
respondent's caution disposes of all the conten-
tions of the appellants based on the assumption 
that contributory negligence was shown as a mat-
ter of law, as well as their contentions regarding 
the instructions on the subject given and refused. 
Mere abstraction on the part of a pedestrian does 
not constitute contributory negligence. Robinson 
v. Pioche, 5 Cal. 461 ; Perkins v. Sunset Tel. & Tel. 
Co., 155 Cal. 722, 103 Pac. 190. The question of 
contributory negligence was properly submitted 
to the jury under correct instructions." 
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Numerous other cases which discussed other types 
of distractions and which hold that such distractions are 
sufficient to make a jury question on the matter of con-
tributory negligence are cited and discussed at 70 A.L.R. 
1388. 
An interesting case discussing the proposition that 
the plaintiff would be guilty of contributory negligence if 
she had knowledge of the defect causing her fall is the 
case of Wolverton v. Village of Saranac, 171 Mich.419, 
137 N. W. 211. There plaintiff while attempting to avoid 
son1e of the holes in the sidewalk, stepped into a larger 
hole and was thrown onto the sidewalk and seriously 
injured. The Michigan court in its decision stated that 
the fact that the plaintiff had the defect specifically in 
mind would not necessarily change the issue from one 
of fact to one of law. It would only affect the degree of 
care which plaintiff should exercise. 
See also Carton v. City of Philadelphia, 146 Pa. 
Super. Ct. 381, 22 A. 2d 603. 
From the foregoing authorities it is plain that con-
tributory negligence under the evidence in this case is 
a question of fact for the jury to decide. The decision 
of the court that plaintiff was contributorily negligent 
as matter of law unlawfully deprives plaintiff of her 
constitutional right to a jury trial. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
14 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff respectfully submits that the court should 
reverse the decision of the trial court and remand plain-
tiff's cause of action to the District Court for a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAWLINGS, WALLACE, BLACK, 
ROBERTS & BLACK, 
DWIGHT L. KING, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
530 Judge Building, 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 
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Received -------------------- copies of the within Brief of 
Appellant this -------------------- day of July, A.D. 1951. 
Attorneys for Defendant, Third-
Party Plaintiff and Respondent. 
Attorneys for Third Party 
Defendant and Respondent. 
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